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PN Haksar and Indira’s India: A Glimpse of the Domestic Sphere, 1967-1976 
 
Abstract 
 
This article presents four episodes from the political period 1969 to 1976 in India, focusing on the 
views and actions of PN Haksar, principal secretary and adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
(1967-73). Unlike the ‘high politics’ hitherto under focus from then i.e. Congress split (1969), birth of 
Bangladesh (1971) and the JP Movement/Emergency (1974-5), the aspects under consideration in this 
article were of subterranean existence. These are, first, the provincial reverberations of the Congress 
split, the case considered here being that of Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee (BPCC). Second, 
the attitude of the Congress party towards left opposition, the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPI 
(M)), in West Bengal, as revealed through the anxieties of Governor Shanti Dhavan. The third aspect 
under consideration is a glimpse of Centre-States relations, as shown through New Delhi’s interactions 
with the EMS Namboodiripad-led and CPI (M)-dominated United Front Government of Kerala. 
Finally, the article looks at Haksar’s attempts at planning and development for the state of Bihar. Each 
of these four themes was among the ‘wider range of functions’ that Mrs Gandhi wished to be 
performed by her Secretariat and allow us to test how successful it was. Each of these provides context 
for contemporary issues.  
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Introduction  
 
Parmeshwar Narain (PN) Haksar has been called ‘probably the most influential and 
powerful person’ in Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s government from 1967 to 1973 
(Frank 2001: 314). A student at the LSE in the 1930s and a lawyer at Allahabad in the 
1940s, he was taken in the Indian Foreign Service by Jawaharlal Nehru and served in 
the UK, Austria and Nigeria, before joining the Prime Minister’s Secretariat (PMS) in 
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May 1967. Once there, Haksar ‘proved to be the ablest and most upright adviser 
Indira ever had’ (Malhotra 1989: 96). He has been portrayed as the mandarin behind 
the ‘leftward turns’ (nationalisation of banks and abolishment of privy purses and 
other privileges of the princely states) the Prime Minister took in 1969-70 and the 
‘elixir of victory’ she tasted in the electoral battlefield as well as in East Pakistan in 
1971 (Guha 2008: 434-66; Raghavan 2013). His has been called ‘the hand that guided 
Indira through the 1969 split of the Congress Party’ (Frank 2001: 314). Indeed, their 
political lives have been pronounced as intertwined recently, in an account that is 
Haksar’s ‘own life story’ based upon his own archives (Ramesh 2018: xvi). 
Consequently, his jettisoning by her from September 1973 is held as a factor in the 
fall of Mrs Gandhi (Frank 2001: 352-53), which culminated in the emergency, the 
excesses of which did not leave even Haksar untouched (Krishnan 2011: 169). 
 
Haksar, then, was first of all a political player. He had to be in that transitional period 
of late-1960s, when a new contract was being forged in India between state and 
society, which Indira’s Congress would actively frame. Haksar joined the PMS within 
months of the fourth general election in February 1967. An electorate of 250 million 
had voted in an election that was marred by more violence than the three previous 
occasions put together; symbolic of a general mood of challenge to the state prevalent 
in the country. Congress had won 281+ seats out of 521 in the Lok Sabha thereby 
securing a working majority of 45. It secured less than half of the assembly seats and 
lost its majority in a staggering ten states – Punjab, Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh 
(UP), Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Madras, Kerala and Manipur. Party factionalism, 
united opposition and a two-decade long stint in power breeding complacency among 
ministers and disillusionment among voters were the chief reasons for this dramatic 
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downturn in Congress’ fortunes.0F1 The Grand Old Party had to shed some dead wood 
and re-orient itself around the personality of Mrs Gandhi to be able to retain its long-
held power. She had herself written to Haksar before he joined her PMS that ‘the state 
of affairs is quite extraordinary here...Congress as a party is dormant and inactive. We 
are at the beginning of a new dark age’.1F2 To dispel this darkness, she wanted Haksar 
by her side. Writing to ‘ask if [he] would be willing to come to Delhi’, while still in 
the middle of the 1967 election campaign, Mrs Gandhi scribbled a note that provides 
a rare peek into her personal view of the long-gone syndicate world of the Congress’ 
regional satraps: 
 
Re: present position – Kamaraj has held talks with Morarji [Desai] and has told him that 
he no longer supports me. He says that Atulya Ghosh and Sanjiva Reddy will support 
him. [SK] Patil is a new entrant, backed by the Bombay industrialists, strongly by 
Mafatlal and Tata. Having collected money in my name for the AICC, he has doled it out 
individually to CMs and candidates for LS. He says he has most of the CMs in his pocket 
+ 200 MPs!! No industrialist, except of Madras, will [support] Kamaraj and many of 
them are anti-Morarji too. My own view is that the CMs will support me, with the 
exception of Bihar and perhaps Assam. In Bihar, things are in a mess, one group supports 
Kamaraj and one Patil and one Morarji. In Assam there are two groups, one will very 
definitely support me; the other may or may not. Orissa is doubtful too – success in the 
elections is doubtful and their behaviour after election is also doubtful though most 
people feel that both groups will support me. UP – both groups are supporting [me] at the 
moment. [CB] Gupta would like Morarji included in the Cabinet. A short time ago he 
was very angry with Patil but may make up because of funds. Rajasthan and MP seem 
confident of victory and both support me. DP Mishra is a tricky person and is trying to be 
                                                 
1 Note on the Fourth General Election, Subject File Serial No. 251 (III Instalment), PN Haksar Papers 
(NMML) 
2 Undated, Indira Gandhi to Haksar, Correspondence File (III Instalment), Haksar Papers 
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“in” with everyday. Mysore, though very close to Kamaraj, has assured me of support 
and so has CM Andhra [but] the Sanjiva Reddy group in Andhra will be against me. 
West Bengal CM will probably support although he has not said so. Atulya Ghosh who is 
loudly and publicly proclaiming support may hedge. Maharastra is solid and reliable – 
both [YB] Chavan and the CM. Gujarat will naturally support Morarji. Madras will 
support me unless Kamaraj is in the field, in which case about half may still support me. 
Kerala will be for me, so probably will Punjab, Himachal and Kashmir. Haryana is very 
much for Morarji but will see which way the wind is blowing.2F3  
 
In dismantling this byzantine Congress, a process that was more long-drawn and 
contested than indicated by the events of November-December 1969 formalising the 
party’s split, Haksar was right on the front-line. Various facets of this process – not 
central but of no less importance – remain un-explored when compared with the high 
water-marks of that period. A key reason earlier was lack of sources for such an 
exercise but since Haksar’s papers have come into public domain that is no longer the 
case as is evident from their recent use as a ‘privileged window’ into the India-
Pakistan war of 1971 and then the JP movement of 1974 (Raghavan 2013; Guha 
2008: 467-92). By further plumbing them, this article probes four aspects of the 
political climate of those times and Haksar’s presence in them. These are, first, the 
provincial reverberations of the split on the internal politics of the Congress, the case 
considered here being that of Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee (BPCC). After 
only a few weeks in his job, Haksar had felt strongly that ‘the most obvious and 
elementary principles of the basic framework of our policies have either been 
forgotten or their significance and validity not understood’. It took longer, and was 
more difficult, to re-establish this ‘basic framework’ through a revamped organisation 
                                                 
3 5-6 February 1967, Indira Gandhi to Haksar, Correspondence File (III Instalment), Haksar Papers 
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at lower levels than Haksar expected.3F4 Second, it looks at the attitude of the Congress 
party towards left opposition, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)), in 
West Bengal. Along with jurist Shanti Dhavan, the man he successfully recommended 
as Governor of West Bengal, Haksar was ‘very much concerned’ with the gathering 
strength of the CPI (M), and their views and actions highlight the delicate role of the 
Governor from yet another unflattering vantage.4F5  
 
The third aspect under consideration is Centre-States relations, not the constitutional 
conundrums on federalism but its practical implications as shown through New 
Delhi’s interactions with Kerala. In November 1967, EMS Namboodiripad-led and 
CPI (M)-dominated United Front government submitted a memorandum on the 
financial relationship between the Centre and the States on which ‘the only comment’ 
that Haksar could make was that ‘if Namboodiripad had been Prime Minister, he 
would have argued in favour of an exactly contrary proposition in order to emphasise 
the unity and integrity of India’ [Italics mine].5F6 This was an illustration of Haksar’s 
identification with the ‘broad ideological consensus regarding the sovereignty of the 
nation-state [and] its potential to unite Indians’, which had existed in the Congress 
since independence.6F7 Finally, the article looks at planning and development, chiefly 
                                                 
4 21 June 1967, Haksar to Indira Gandhi, 398/Secy/67, Subject File Serial No. 195 (III Instalment), 
Haksar Papers 
5 2 September 1969, Shanti Dhavan to Haksar, 722/PS/HC/69, Subject File Serial No. 199 (III 
Instalment), Haksar Papers 
6 30 November 1967, Haksar to Indira Gandhi, 12007/Secy/67, Subject File Serial No. 123 (III 
Instalment), Haksar Papers 
7 Sunil Purushotham, “Destroying Hyderabad and Making the Nation”, Economic and Political Weekly 
XLIX (22):29 
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its political workings through a study of Bihar. Haksar, Deputy Chairman of Planning 
Commission (1975-77), had resolved in 1972 that he would not allow Bihar to be 
‘written off’.7F8 This was two years before JP’s movement brought the spotlight on the 
state and made it a battle-ground of wills between JP and Mrs Gandhi.  
 
Each of these four themes was among the ‘wider range of functions’ that Mrs Gandhi 
wished to be performed by the reorganised PMS. LK Jha, her outgoing Secretary, 
cautioned her that ‘any sizeable increase in PMS would be a matter for public 
comment and possibly some internal criticism’ and, instead, recommended the 
relatively non-controversial strengthening of the Cabinet Secretariat, which was also 
under the Prime Minister.8F9 He also warned her that the ‘PM may come in for a certain 
amount of personal criticism’ on Haksar’s appointment to an enhanced and 
empowered Secretarial post, given that he was still only an officer of the Additional-
Secretary rank.9F10 Nevertheless, Haksar was not only ‘hand-picked’ by Mrs Gandhi for 
the above-mentioned personal affinity and ideological reasons (Frank 2001: 313), but 
a measure of his standing can be gauged by the following note he sent to her almost 
exactly three years from his appointment: 
 
I do not share the conviction that some Ministers whom I know to be wholly incompetent 
or otherwise undesirable, must, of necessity, be accommodated [in the new council of 
ministers]. I have particularly in mind Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, KK Shah, Jagannath Rao, 
                                                 
8 9 May 1972, DN Sinha to Haksar, Subject File Serial No. 232 (Notes as PS to PM, 1967-73, III 
Instalment), Haksar Papers 
9 17 March 1967, LK Jha to Indira Gandhi, Subject File Serial No. 195 (III Instalment), Haksar Papers 
10 20 March 1967, LK Jha to Indira Gandhi, Subject File Serial No. 195 (III Instalment), Haksar Papers 
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IK Gujral, Dinesh Singh, Jagjivan Ram, Dr Karan Singh, VC Shukla, Triguna Sen, 
VKRV Rao, K Hanumanthaiya, K Raghu Ramaiah, Bali Ram Bhagat and GL Nanda.10F11  
 
The confidence in this note can be gauged by the fact that each of these gentlemen 
had a prolific political career. Secondly, each of these themes and Haksar’s views on 
them help us further compliment and corroborate his portrayal in the domestic milieu 
hitherto drawn along ideological and intellectual lines or with a ‘high-minded sense of 
social purpose to advance the national interest’ (Ramesh 2018: xv). To the extent 
Haksar’s political instincts and motivations have been questioned, it has been in the 
realms of the re-structuring of Congress party, working of Mrs Gandhi’s government 
and its forays into international politics. Herein, it is well-established that he was a 
socialist with ‘a strong moral core’ who wanted to bring in ‘meaningful social 
reform’, a ‘committed’ bureaucrat of integrity and an ‘erudite and experienced 
diplomat [who] thought in terms of historical parallels’ (Guha 2008: 436; Hewitt 
2007: 97; Frank 2001: 314; Raghavan 2013: 59). Finally, each of these themes 
provides context for issues relevant today. Congress is in shambles and could do with 
a 1969-style renaissance. The same is true for the Left opposition in the country. 
Centre-states relation is expected to take a fraught turn with a strong, single-party 
central government in power after thirty years. As for Bihar, notwithstanding the 
decade long so-called sushasan, it continues to bring up the rear on most socio-
economic indices of development.  
 
Congress Party Politics (Bombay)  
                                                 
11 14 March 1971, Haksar to Indira Gandhi, Subject File Serial No. 164 (Guard Files, III Instalment), 
Haksar Papers 
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In October 1969, in the midst of the Congress split, Haksar wrote to Mrs Gandhi, 
‘politically speaking, Bombay is a festering sore and it can only be cleansed up if PM 
were to pay a visit and address a big public meeting’.11F12 Bombay, the financial capital 
of the country as well as the financial fountain for the Congress was a key 
battleground for Mrs Gandhi against the old guard in the party. Bombay Congress had 
been controlled by SK Patil since the days of Vallabhbhai Patel. Patil’s clout stemmed 
from his financial prowess, a measure of which was his collection of Rs 70 lakhs for 
the party coffers in the 1967 general election, and his control over what Rajni Kothari 
called the ‘faction-chains’ of the Congress there, of ‘critical importance’ then.12F13 His 
shock defeat from Bombay (South) in 1967 ‘at the hands of the young trade unionist 
and Socialist Party candidate George Fernandes sent waves across the country’ and 
weakened the Congress’ old guard (Krishna 2011: 78). As the party split in the 
autumn of 1969, its provincial ramifications percolated and the events and 
personalities in Bombay show the ‘confusion in the minds of Congress workers about 
the position’.  
 
Even after Mrs Gandhi had been expelled from the Congress for ‘indiscipline’ by S 
Nijalingappa, party’s president, on 12 November 1969, a resolution was passed eight 
days later in Bombay, in which the local Congress had committed to work for ‘unity’. 
In an example of Patil’s enduring strength, the Bombay Congress Committee office 
                                                 
12 18 October 1969, Haksar to Indira Gandhi, Subject File Serial No. 142 (III Instalment), Haksar 
Papers 
13 Kothari, Rajni. 1964. “The Congress ‘System’ in India”, Asian Survey Volume 4, No. 12, (1161-73), 
1163-64 
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continued ‘to work exclusively on behalf of the Old Congress’ even as Mrs Gandhi’s 
Congress, Congress (Ruling-R), held its session in Bombay in December. MR Vyas, a 
‘Young Turk’ of the New Congress, who would go on to become the Bombay 
Congress Chief in 1972, complained to Haksar about the continuing ‘gross misuse of 
the [Congress organisation] in the interest of the Old Congress’ in Bombay and 
requested him to ‘ascertain and clarify at the earliest the correct position and to chalk 
out a programme of action to remove this anomalous and highly ambiguous 
situation’.13F14 Vyas emphasised the importance of not letting ‘matters drift’ and not 
allowing ‘the Old Guards to malign the new forces under PM by default’.14F15 In 
January 1970, Vyas reported that the ‘BPCC [was] sliding over into the hands of SK 
Patil’, as much because of Patil’s machinations as because of the non-Bombay, 
Maharastra leaders of the New Congress.   
 
Maharastra Congress Committee leadership, with YB Chavan’s consent, is eager to let 
SK Patil retain Bombay Congress Committee uncontested and force a separate ad hoc 
body for Bombay. Vasant Patil (MPCC President) has virtually been presiding at all such 
meeting dealing with Bombay, thereby publicly exhibiting that though in theory the ad 
hoc body would be a “Bombay one”, it would be more or less an appendage of 
Maharastra. Whether this is intentional or a mere “slip”, I do not know. The forces 
wanting an ad hoc body are powerful and do not wish to lose anytime. This will enable 
Patil to exploit the non-Maharastrian wealth on the one hand and feed the Shiv Sena [on 
                                                 
14 31 December 1969, Vyas to Yagnik, Shah and Kher, Subject File Serial No. 197 (Notes as PS to PM, 
1967-73, III Instalment), Haksar Papers 
15 31 December 1969, Vyas to Haksar, Subject File Serial No. 197 (Notes as PS to PM, 1967-73, III 
Instalment), Haksar Papers 
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the other]. I would suggest that PM has a frank and personal talk with Vasant Rao 
Naik.15F16 
 
This factionalism between Marathi-speaking Maharastrian politicians and the Gujarati 
political players in the more cosmopolitan Bombay was a legacy of the regional gulf 
in the old Bombay Presidency and Central Province (CP) and had come to fore in 
1937-38 in the KF Nariman and NB Khare episodes (Baker 1979: 32-48, 70; Low 
1993: 82; Kuracina 2010). These have been explained as an ‘outcome of personal 
ambition and ego, clashing with the party decorum, discipline and national interest’ 
(Singh 2015: 130). However, in March 1937, ‘if popularity were the only criterion’, 
Khurshed Nariman would have been elected as the leader of the Bombay Congress 
legislative party, victorious in the first provincial elections held under the 1935 
Government of India Act. Nariman, president of the BPCC during and before the 
elections and leader in the Gandhian civil disobedience movement earlier, however, 
was ‘not acceptable to KM Munshi and Vallabhbhai Patel’. The latter especially 
thought that if Nariman became Premier, he would not submit to the control of the 
high command because of his independent personality’ and popularity, and ‘saw to it’ 
that a pliable BG Kher was elected instead.16F17 Patel’s fears were not phantom and were 
realised in the Khare episode of 1938, which was the climax of the Maharashtra-
Mahakoshal/Marathi-Hindi divide in the neighbouring CP Congress. Unlike Nariman, 
Khare had formed the first Congress Ministry in the CP in July 1937. Soon, 
                                                 
16 4 January 1970, Vyas to Haksar, Subject File Serial No. 197 (Notes as PS to PM, 1967-73, III 
Instalment), Haksar Papers 
17 Chapter Four, “The Congress Government in Power (1937-1939)”, 242-5; 
http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/138359/9/09_chapter%204.pdf (accessed 3 January 
2018)  
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differences emerged between him and his Ministers from the Hindi-speaking parts of 
the province and, three of them, RS Shukla, Mishra and DS Mehta, resigned in early 
1938. In July 1938, Khare sought to dissolve his bickering ministry to facilitate a 
fresh formation, with the British Governor’s agreement. Patel warned him against 
doing so unless instructed by the Congress high command. Khare ignored him and 
was expelled from the party, while a new ministry was formed under Shukla.17F18 
 
Over 1970-71, gradually it became clear that ‘all sorts’ were included in the new 
Bombay Congress with ‘little relevance to [their] actual support to the PM’s 
progressive policies’. As Vyas complained, ‘persons, who had pushed around people 
like me at the undivided BPCC when we took up the cudgels on behalf of PM’s 
policies, became the masters’. The new Congress in Bombay thus began ‘on the same 
line as taught by SK Patil...a replica of SK Patil’s Congress’. It did not matter 
electorally for thanks to the national state of affairs, Congress won in Bombay, but 
long-term damage was done in terms of its organisation. Vyas reminded Uma Shankar 
Dixit, ICS-turned-politician and the treasurer of Mrs Gandhi’s Congress, in January 
1972 that ‘ultimately the success of PM’s policies will depend on the state of the 
party. One of the reasons that the Congress had come to sorry pass by 1967 was that 
the leadership of men like Morarji, SK Patil had made a mockery of the organisation’. 
As one who had been a vocal supporter of Mrs Gandhi in Bombay since August 1969, 
                                                 
18 See Rakesh Ankit (2016), “A regional satrap, a Hindu nationalist and a conservative congressman: 
Dwarka Prasad Mishra (1901–1988)”, Contemporary South Asia, 24:1, 36-49 
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Vyas was disillusioned that, in the new Congress as in the old, ‘political career-ism, 
wire-pulling and mischief-making have acquired positions of vantage’.18F19  
 
Haksar was regularly told that the Bombay Congress had turned into a ‘farce’. The 
root cause was ‘false protégés’ of Mrs Gandhi; leftovers from ‘SK Patil’s stewardship 
of Bombay’.19F20 Vyas and the economist Rajni Patel had emerged as the choices to 
head the new Congress and Mrs Gandhi visited Bombay to bless this new team in 
February 1972. She addressed a mammoth crowd and Vyas was confident about the 
upcoming state election, which he thought would conform to ‘the khaki brigade 
description’.20F21 Haksar, mindful of the Gujarati ‘industrial, commercial and trading’ 
domination of Bombay city, had supported Vyas over Patel in September 1971 as a 
candidate for the Rajya Sabha from Bombay’s new-look Congress party (Ramesh 
2018: 225). Here was another example of the ‘leader-client patronage’,21F22 along 
‘competing local, regional and inter-regional interest groups and networks’ that 
characterised the Congress (Blackstock and Gorman 2014: 256). However, the 
situation would sour soon and spectacularly. By August, a municipal strike raged in 
Bombay,22F23 and, in 1973 more than 12, 000 strikes were called for in the city. Mrs 
Gandhi and her Congress had begun on the downward spiral to 1975.   
                                                 
19 6 January 1972, Vyas to Uma Shankar Dixit, Subject File Serial No. 243 (Notes as PS to PM, 1967-
73, III Instalment), Haksar Papers 
20 13 January 1972, Vyas to Haksar, Subject File Serial No. 243 (Notes as PS to PM, 1967-73, III 
Instalment), Haksar Papers 
21 22 February 1972, Vyas to Haksar, (Notes as PS to PM, 1967-73, III Instalment), Haksar Papers 
22 Kothari, Rajni. “The Congress ‘System’ in India”, 1163 
23 12 August 1972, Vyas to Haksar, Subject File Serial No. 232, (Notes as PS to PM, 1967-73, III 
Instalment), Haksar Papers 
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 Left Opposition (Bengal) 
 
Among the ten states in which the Congress lost power in the 1967 assembly elections 
for the first time since 1947 was West Bengal. Here, the Bangla Congress of Ajoy 
Mukherjee – a breakaway faction – came together with the CPI (M) to form a United 
Front government. The unsteady coalition was in office for only eight months before 
President’s Rule was imposed on Bengal in November 1967. Haksar wrote for Mrs 
Gandhi the argument in support of imposing it. It amounted to an assertion that with 
the CPI (M)’s participation, ‘constitutional government has been rendered 
impossible’.23F24 This reflected the CPI (M)’s then-complicated existence within the 
ambit of the Indian constitution and its attitude towards it, perceived at the time by 
many to be ambiguous. It proved to be immaterial for the CPI (M)’s popularity and 
political hold in the state became clear when the United Front came back to power in 
the elections held in early-1969, with the CPI (M) winning 80 seats compared to 43 in 
1967. The government fared a little better this time and lasted for seventeen months 
till July 1970. Given this scenario, the role of the Governor in West Bengal became 
crucial and Haksar advised Mrs Gandhi to appoint the jurist and diplomat Shanti 
Swaroop Dhavan, his acquaintance from Allahabad. Dhavan was serving as India’s 
High-Commissioner in the UK when he was appointed to the Raj Bhavan in Calcutta. 
His two-year tenure was marked by imposition of the President’s Rule twice in the 
state, a spell that only came to an end with the return of Congress (Indira) to power in 
early-1972 under the leadership of Siddhartha Shankar Ray. A key reason for this 
                                                 
24 22 February 1968, Haksar to Indira Gandhi, Subject File Serial No. 128 (III Instalment), Haksar 
Papers 
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breakdown in the cycle of electoral politics and elected governments, arguably more 
than the usually written about ‘axis of conflicts’ within the CPI (M), between CPI (M) 
and Bangla Congress and between CPI (M) and the Naxalites (Guha 2008: 424-25), 
was the mistrust harboured by Mrs Gandhi, Haksar and Dhavan against the CPI (M) 
and its cadre-based politics. 
 
Dhavan and Haksar, in particular, were alert to the growing strength of the CPI (M). 
In September 1969, even before he formally took charge of West Bengal, Dhavan sent 
a note to Haksar that is quite revealing of the suspicious attitude of the Indian state 
apparatus to the CPI (M) in those days. This was after all still the decade of India’s 
China War (Maxwell 1970), when those from the then-undivided Communist Party of 
India (CPI) who would go on to form the CPI (M) in 1964, were understood to be as 
‘neither exactly nor entirely on India’s side’. Further, the CPI (M) had not entirely 
declared at this time that it either ‘wholly embraced the parliamentary path or wholly 
eschewed armed revolution’.24F25 In it, Dhavan claimed that the CPI (M) was putting 
together a trained volunteer ‘force’ of 50, 000. Dhavan charged the CPI (M) of 
harbouring designs ‘to safeguard the people’s democratic movements in towns and 
villages and to propagate the ideas of good for people’s revolution among the 
masses’. But more than that Dhavan also claimed that the United Front ministers in 
West Bengal approved of the plan to create a volunteer forced to ‘thwart all 
conspiracies against the government’. Dhavan was so concerned that he prepared a 
separate note for Mrs Gandhi, Union Home Minister, Ajoy Mukherjee and Jyoti Basu, 
Mukherjee’s deputy. He wanted Mrs Gandhi to discuss the matter ‘particularly’ with 
                                                 
25 I am grateful to the reviewer for this insertion. On the continuing theoretical unease of some CPI (M) 
leaders toward ‘bourgeois’ parliamentary democracy see Guha, Ramachandra. 2005. “Spaniard and 
Indian”, The Telegraph, Saturday, July 23. 
https://www.telegraphindia.com/1050723/asp/opinion/story_5018901.asp (accessed 2 January 2018).      
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Basu. As he had no locus standi on any of this yet, he wanted Haksar to stop this 
move of the CPI (M). A 50, 000-strong force equalled four army divisions and, loyal 
to a single opposition party, was indeed a matter of concern. Its legal sanction, official 
status and relations with state police were all unanswered questions. More than that, 
for Dhavan, it brought back memories from the 1940s and a key para from his note 
revealed anxieties always latent in the Congress and Indian body politic:    
 
One of the recognised methods by which minority parties in the country in the past have 
obtained political mastery is the raising of a private army or volunteer force. If the 
declared purpose of the CPM’s leaders is a reality, it may be advisable to stop it now 
before it becomes a menace [or] before a stage is reached [imposition of President’s 
rule].25F26 [Italics mine]  
   
This was a case of a Governor articulating ‘the concerns of the centre’ and, more than 
that, of the Congress even before having formally taken charge. It reflected the 
Congress’ old distrust of those interest groups, which were encouraged by the colonial 
state before 1947 to counter them in electoral politics. For the Congress and the 
Indian state, it was not a question of political difference, but their position was that it 
was ‘difficult to rely upon [Communists because] their loyalty to their party overrides 
all other loyalties’. This was not a stand of animosity but, rather, a sense that the 
Communists were like ‘Jesuits belonging to the strict order and not over-scrupulous in 
their dealings with others, provided they carry out the dictates of that order to [which] 
                                                 
26 2 September 1969, Dhavan to Haksar, No. 722/PS/HC/69, Subject File Serial No. 199 (III 
Instalment), Haksar Papers 
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they owe their basic loyalty’.26F27 This distrust not only remained acute till the Congress 
was in opposition in West Bengal but also manifested itself once it returned to power 
in the 1972 state election. Haksar had heard some Congressmen say that ‘they would 
do the “Indonesia” to the CPM’ in West Bengal.27F28 As the SS Ray government settled 
down, it began vindictively against the CPM so much so that Jayaprakash Narayan 
felt compelled to write to the Chief Minister in June 1972. In a measure of Haksar’s 
central importance at the time, JP’s letter was forwarded to him and it was Haksar 
who drafted Ray’s reply. In it, he sought to put the CPI (M)’s role in the United Front 
governments and President’s rule under scanner.    
 
For the last several years, West Bengal has been precariously poised on the brink of a 
disaster...totally inconsistent with the working of democratic processes. Administration 
was tampered to the point of paralysis...There was an atmosphere of violence, 
intimidation and insecurity...It is natural for the CPM to cover up their past 
misdeeds...But I see no reason why others should fall for it. [It] is, to my mind, bringing 
grist to the mill of those who have no use for democratic processes. [Italics mine] 
 
To JP’s charge of rigging in the elections and demand for an inquiry, Haksar was even 
more bullish: ‘Why should there be [an] inquiry? In any case, such an exercise is 
futile because it cannot inspect the ballot papers, election documents cannot be seen 
[and] witnesses can neither be summoned nor put on oath’. Quite improbably, Haksar 
concluded that results of an inquiry ‘cannot bring any comfort to the people of West 
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Bengal who have suffered so much in these few years’.28F29 This was yet another 
example of the Congress employing popular will to achieve narrow goals made 
possible by it becoming ‘a political and ideational end in itself’ (Tudor 2013: 207).  
 
Centre-States Relation (Kerala)  
 
In November 1967, the CPI (M) government of Kerala led by EMS Namboodiripad 
submitted a memorandum in New Delhi in support of a plea that ‘the Central 
Government should review the broad question of centre-state financial relationship’. 
This set off a five-year long tussle between Mrs Gandhi and the opposition that only 
ended with the return of Congress ministries in most, if not all, states after the 1972 
elections. In its background was the experience of the first CPI government in Kerala 
in 1957-59 and its dismissal by Jawaharlal Nehru’s Union Government. With their 
victory in the assembly election, the CPI had ‘gravely undermined the Congress’ 
claim to represent all of India’. It followed it with a reformist Agrarian Relations Bill 
‘providing stability of tenure to small peasants who cultivated holdings owned by 
absentee landlords’ and a controversial Educational Bill ‘aimed at correcting the 
abuses in privately owned schools and colleges…managed by the Church, the Nair 
Service Society and the SNDP’. Between February 1959, when Mrs Gandhi was 
elected the Congress president and June 1959, when Nehru visited Kerala, the 
situation in the state had deteriorated dramatically into a showdown between an 
‘opportunistic alliance of the Church, the Nairs and the local Congress Party’ and the 
‘people’s government’ of EMS Namboodiripad, which saw 150, 000 protestors being 
                                                 
29 12 June 1972, Ray to JP (drafted by Haksar), Subject File Serial No. 53 (Guard Files, I and II 
Instalments), Haksar Papers 
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jailed. With a hesitant and reluctant Nehru finally giving in, President’s Rule was 
imposed in July ‘on account of a breakdown in law and order’ (Guha 2008: 289-296). 
This history of tension fed the current suspicion in relations. 
 
Namboodiripad wanted ‘widening’ of the tax-base for states comprising the 
Corporation Tax, Gift Tax and Wealth Tax – all of which went exclusively to the 
centre. Secondly, he urged setting up a permanent Finance Commission, 
complementing the Planning Commission, instead of one being set-up every five 
years. Third, he recommended establishment of a Centre-State Council as ‘a national 
forum for discussing major monetary and fiscal policies and review of the pattern of 
plan assistance’. The crucial assumption underlying Namboodiripad’s memorandum, 
as grudgingly acknowledged to Mrs Gandhi by Haksar, was that ‘in our country we 
are destined to have different political parties in power in various states’.29F30 Having 
conceded that, he could not yet ‘conceive of how to prima facie invent a device 
whereby the friction between the states and the centre is reduced’. The context of 
Namboodiripad’s memorandum was the food crisis in Kerala, especially the shortage 
of rice that year. The Central Government had promised 75, 000 tonnes of rice per 
month to Kerala at the beginning of 1967 but despatches varied between 22, 000 and 
40, 000 tonnes. As a result, rationing was imposed in the state at the rate of 160-180 
grams per head per day. By late-1967, even this half supply of rice ration was under 
threat. While wheat supplies were maintained at 50, 000 tonnes per month, as the 
Governor of Kerala put it in his monthly report,  
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We cannot ignore the fact that people here are essentially rice-eating. They cannot 
understand why all the rice-eating states in South India cannot be treated alike. If India is 
one country, then there can be no justification for surplus states like Andhra and Orissa 
issuing for higher rations of rice than a state like Kerala. The question is not merely one 
of supplies of rice; the whole problem is intimately connected with politics. Failure of the 
Central Government to maintain adequate supplies of rice and particularly their failure to 
treat all rice-eating states on the same footing have given a strong argument in the hands 
of various political parties to condemn the Central Government. A strong political 
propaganda is on foot to present the picture to people as an attempt on the part of the 
Central Government to starve out Kerala and to create special difficulties for the 
[Namboodiripad] Ministry in an attempt to topple the State Government.30F31 
 
Indeed, Mrs Gandhi’s and Food Minister Jagjivan Ram’s initial attempts to procure 
rice from other states for Kerala had run into a Congress-opposition divide. They had 
pressed the Congress-run Andhra Pradesh to release rice for Kerala and, ‘as a pressure 
on the government of Andhra’, Mrs Gandhi even considered ‘not going to the opening 
of the Nagarjunasagar dam complex’. Haksar dissuaded her from this course of action 
after finding out from the Food Corporation of India (FCI) that whereas Andhra was 
in a tight corner, it was the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) government of CN 
Annadurai in Tamil Nadu that was ‘sitting on a considerable pile’. The FCI’s estimate 
was that Annadurai had a stock of 150, 000 tonnes of rice and ‘could be persuaded to 
release part of it if he had a firm assurance of a replacement’.31F32 
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Mrs Gandhi’s strategy to deal with opposition-ruled states, after her electoral and 
military triumphs in the 1970-71, was to hold elections there and have her party return 
to power. This cavalier approach earned her some reproach from her father’s and 
Mahatma Gandhi’s old colleagues like Mridula Sarabhai and CS Natu (Servants of the 
People Society). She brushed aside Sarabhai’s suggestion that she wanted to win 
elections by ‘hook or crook’.32F33 To Natu, who complained to her about the ‘recent 
alliance of the Congress…with the Muslim League’ in Kerala, she replied at length 
revealing a little her ends-oriented attitude to electoral politics. This too was a reply 
drafted in the first instance by Haksar:  
 
Both in Kerala and West Bengal as elsewhere, the CPM have been adopting certain 
policies and programmes which presented very serious problems. We could have ignored 
this fact but this would have been disastrous...In the larger interest of dealing with the 
CPM, the Congress Party made some minor adjustments. The results of the elections 
showed the correctness of the strategy adopted...I presume that you would not think that 
we have jettisoned our principles.33F34 [Italics mine] 
 
To pave way for elections, the experience of imposition of the President’s Rule under 
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution came handy. This was the article under which 
Namboodiripad’s first government had been dismissed in July 1959, with an eager 
Mrs Gandhi as the then-Congress President. Now, her fifteen years in power scaled 
new heights in deploying this arbitrary measure thereby taking the federal structure of 
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the Indian democracy down by quite a few notches. To Haksar, varied conditions, 
circumstances and political considerations notwithstanding, it was clear that 
President’s Rule ought to lead to fresh election and between 1967 and 1972 he 
marshalled the evidence for its imposition in many states followed by an election 
invariably propitious for the Congress party riding on the coat-tails of Mrs Gandhi’s 
personal popularity. As he put it in a note composed in February 1968 on the-then 
prevailing situation in Haryana and Rajasthan: ‘Why should the legislative remain 
suspended if their sense of loyalty has brought about the state of affairs where 
constitutional government is not possible?’34F35 In believing this, Haksar did not spare 
even the Congress-run states (Ramesh 2018: 308-09). In January 1973, he advised 
Mrs Gandhi to not bother with revamping the Congress in Andhra Pradesh as it was 
‘not likely to make a dent on the ugly situation prevailing there...the present 
[Congress] CM and Government having proved their incompetence the state would 
give way to the President’s Rule’. If anyone argued that President’s Rule made 
‘confrontation’ between the Union and the states ‘more direct’, Haksar was ready to 
contend that it was ‘already direct and against the PM’. Therefore, it was incorrect to 
say that ‘President’s Rule will add any new dimension to the confrontation’. On the 
contrary, President’s Rule, for Haksar, provided ‘just the right kind of [tool] to reform 
ranks within the existing Congress’.35F36 
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Elections and economy aside, the Centre-State relations in those days also had a 
critical impact on judiciary (Ramesh 2018: 281-82). In the first half of 1972, the 
appointment of judges to the High Court in Uttar Pradesh became a bone of 
contention between New Delhi and Lucknow – both run by Congress governments. 
Eventually in mid-July, Mrs Gandhi met Chief Minister Kamalapati Tripathi and 
Haksar’s background note for the meeting is an excellent exposition of the infamous 
conception of ‘committed judiciary’ that the chief mandarin and the Prime Minister 
espoused. Haksar began by urging Mrs Gandhi to remind Tripathi that  
 
Appointment of High Court judges is a matter of highest political importance. Many of 
our problems get complicated [otherwise]. Consequently, it should be a matter of 
common concern of the CM of UP and PM, who belong to the same political party, to 
have identity of approach and views on this. [Italics mine] 
 
Tripathi had taken umbrage that New Delhi had intervened in the appointment of 
High Court judges and Haksar retorted that since the Supreme Court had been such ‘a 
source of trouble to us...if judges of High Courts continued to be appointed with 
reckless disregard, the Supreme Court of the future has no chance of improving itself’ 
because most of the Judges in the Supreme Court were recruited from the High 
Courts. If it was ‘a question of amour proper’ for Tripathi then it was also ‘a matter of 
amour proper of the PM’; in any case  
 
The question of amour proper might have been understandable if the argument had been 
between the Central Government and a Government like that of Tamil Nadu but when 
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the question of “prestige” is raised between the CM of UP and the PM, we are reaching a 
situation of complete impasse.36F37 [Italics mine] 
 
Inevitably, he ended with a threat: ‘if PM cannot persuade him then [Centre] will have 
to exercise its constitutional right to advice the President that a particular Judge may 
or may not be appointed’. As Mrs Gandhi showed inclinations to take this path, 
Jagjivan Ram – a veteran of Nehru’s 1946 Interim Government and the Dalit face of 
the Congress, who would only leave Mrs Gandhi in February 1977 – was expressing 
to people ‘his discontent, regret over the fact that gradually she was becoming a 
dictator’ even before the December 1971 Bangladesh war.37F38 While the March 1973 
episode of the elevation of AN Ray as the Chief Justice of India, superseding three of 
his senior colleagues, is well-known and linked to Haksar’s view that ‘judges as well 
as civil servants should be “committed” to the policies and philosophy of the 
government in power’ (Guha 2008: 474), the above note shows the extent of this 
inclination that Haksar held from much before.   
 
Planning and Development (Bihar)   
 
As has been demonstrated recently, through his time in the PMO and later Planning 
Commission, ‘Haksar agonised over the special development challenges in India’s 
two most populous states - UP and Bihar. He never let go of an opportunity of 
imploring the prime minister to put her personal weight behind land reforms, 
especially in Bihar’ (Ramesh 2018: 155). Relatedly, Haksar also identified Bihar as a 
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problem state for the Congress. In March 1972, in an elaborate note on Congress’ 
factionalism to the Prime Minister, he wrote thus on Bihar: 
 
Unless we have a Chief Minister who commands at least the acquiescence of other 
factions and of the very large number of candidates for CM-ship, disaster is in store for 
the Congress in a matter of few years. Bihar desperately needs a firm CM, a wise 
Governor and a team of good civil servants in the Secretariat at Patna.38F39 
 
Among his interlocutors in the state was Prof Mahendra Pratap, Vice-Chancellor of 
Patna University that would be the scene of the JP-led student movement against Mrs 
Gandhi two years hence. He had been warning Haksar about the deteriorating 
situation inside the University and the inability of the state government to do 
something about it due to vested interests in administration and semi-criminal 
elements in the police. Higher education in Bihar was ‘at the mercy of intrigue and 
pressure-tactics’.39F40 That was just the tip of the iceberg. If Mrs Gandhi’s 1970 election 
slogan of garibi hatao applied anywhere, it was Bihar, the poorest state in the 
country. Urging Haksar to make ‘revolutionary changes in the administrative 
machinery ruling the state’, DN Sinha (President, Bihar Co-operative Federation 
Limited) summed up Bihar’s troubles well: ‘the recent history of economic 
development in this state may be summed up as progression from poverty to 
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pauperism’.40F41 By September 1972, there was a tone of crisis in Haksar’s notes on 
Bihar. Asking the Union Home Secretary to be in ‘constant touch with what appears 
to be a fast-deteriorating situation’, he felt that the Congress’ state government lacked 
a capacity to deal with ‘a near-chaotic situation’. Suggesting ‘anticipatory action’ and 
deployment of the army and para-military forces, Haksar’s targets were exactly those 
that Mrs Gandhi would single out during the 1974-75 JP agitation: ‘Communists, 
students, and the Jan Sangh’.41F42 That year also saw a burgeoning power crisis in India, 
which would be worsen after the 1973 global oil shock. Bihar was of some 
importance here because of the near-entire production of nation’s coal there, as 
Jharkhand was then a part of the state, and it provided an occasion for Haksar to 
invoke Mrs Gandhi’s favourite bogey: the anti-national foreign hand. Sample this note 
on the situation in thermal electricity production in the state: 
 
The extent of the involvement of politicians and the officers of the Bihar government in 
the affairs of the Bihar state electricity board is deep and abiding. Once a number of MPs 
demanded a Commission of Inquiry and Mr Ranchor Prasad was appointed to enquire. 
Mr Prasad is fully involved with the American activities in the country...This group of 
saboteurs has a very powerful lobby in Delhi. [It] enjoys the protection of [pro-US] Dr 
KL Rao [Union Minister for Power].42F43 [Italics mine] 
 
In early 1973, nearly 180 million people were affected by a spreading drought in the 
country. That year, prices rose by 23% and by early 1974, following the global oil 
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crisis, India’s import increased by a billion dollars and the resultant crisis within 
urban workforce came to fore in the May railway strike of more than a million 
workers. It was followed in August 1974 by a student movement in Bihar, which 
provided the stage for Jayaprakash Narayan’s return to politics in opposition to the 
Congress government in Bihar. Haksar, who would later confess that he was 
‘obsessed’ by Bihar, urged Mrs Gandhi in October to mount an ‘Operation Bihar’. 
Sidelined from active politics by now in the Planning Commission as its Deputy 
Chairman, Haksar had time to pursue his obsessions and he commissioned four 
reports on the state in the two years of 1975 and 1976. First of these was on ‘political 
power in Bihar’. It began by drawing a picture of a ‘feudal system [of] fear and 
favour’ sustained by caste chains between the MLAs and his ‘muscle men’. On this 
‘basic political system’ rested the administrative machinery in Bihar and unless the 
former was dismantled, the latter could not be improved. Taking on JP and his social 
movement, the paper went on,  
 
Some people like JP are naively expecting that the elective system will give relief and all 
they have to do is to select good men. We have had many elections in Bihar and many 
good men have fallen by the wayside. We should not forget that it is the electorate that is 
perpetuating the system and we have to look to [this] environment for an answer.  
 
So, if JP’s ‘Total Revolution’ was not the solution then what was? According to the 
report, it was ‘agricultural revolution’ propelled by the ‘farmers’ service society 
concept [that] brings in the commercial bank to induce growth and controls the 
finances but allows general policy decision to the small men in the villages’. It was 
imperative to ‘go all out with this attack before the [political] power structure wakes 
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up and tries to sabotage the concept’.43F44 The follow-up to this note was prepared in the 
Planning Commission in February 1976. It made it plain to Haksar that a ‘very 
considerable amount of political organisation supported by adequate supply of credit’ 
was needed to make any dent on the situation in Bihar. Haksar could, practically 
speaking, calibrate the state’s plan in terms of allotments to power and irrigation 
projects and social services.44F45 By May, with the emergency in full swing, Haksar was 
feeling ‘oppressed’ by Bihar and ordered the Planning Commission officials to 
‘disaggregate’ the points made in the notes above, examine the state ‘more minutely’ 
and come up with a ‘specific strategy for Bihar assuming that there is a political will 
to deal with that state’ [italics mine].45F46 The result was yet another study that went 
over familiar territory of ‘feudal socio-economic system’, ‘primitive agriculture’ and 
a ‘caste-based social structure’. It also made it clear that Haksar’s favoured solution of 
land re-distribution was a ‘theoretical answer’ and the practical reality was that  
 
The political structure in Bihar cannot afford to displease the local power structure. The 
entire power structure is against any compromise. Bihar believes in feudalism [of which] 
it is a classic example.46F47 
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Armed with all these papers, Haksar wrote a long and detailed note to Mrs Gandhi on 
29 September 1976.  He began by arguing that as ‘the forging of a viable political 
instrument [state Congress] for bringing about changes may take time’, the 
‘administrative apparatus’ remained the only available instrument. This proposition 
had the great merit of chiming in neatly with the then-prevailing emergency. Haksar 
further elaborated on its effectiveness by pointing, as Mrs Gandhi knew only too well, 
that ‘the entire system [during emergency] has reacted to the leadership like a steed 
that knows his rider’. But the system in Bihar suffered from too much chopping and 
changing. No officer in the state had a settled tenure. Between 1973 and 1976, there 
had been three Chief Secretaries, four Development Commissioners, four Planning 
Secretaries and three Agricultural production Commissioners. If this was the first area 
where the Prime Minister could set the matter right, then next was ‘the gay 
abandonment with which Bihar launches the state sector enterprises’. In 1976, there 
were as many as thirty-six State Corporations: ‘means of disbursing political 
patronage’ squandering vast amount of resources. Haksar’s advice was in keeping 
with the temper of times and his mistress: establishing ‘new working relationships’ 
between the Central Government and the rural poor in Bihar by-passing the state 
administration. Abandoning land re-distribution now, he explained his modus 
operandi thus: 
 
One could begin by concentrating on a few districts and try there to change the terms and 
conditions of share cropping, make credit available for productive purposes, promote 
literacy on a massive scale and make adequate arrangement for drainage and ground 
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water exploitation. This can be done with the involvement of selected officials and 
political workers.47F48 
 
Conclusion  
 
At the peak of his influence with Mrs Gandhi, between May 1967 and January 1973 
when he was her ‘ideological compass and moral beacon’ (Ramesh 2018: xiv), PN 
Haksar could offer advice in magisterial terms as under:    
 
I feel that PM should show a sensitive understanding of the so-called “Young 
Turks”...Time has come when PM should reiterate her faith in a socialist society. For this 
purpose, it is necessary to educate people politically, above all the Congress Party 
cadres...Otherwise, nationalisation would end up in mere bureaucratisation and state 
capitalism [and] PM should express anxiety about [this]. A realistic approach would 
consist in improving the efficiency, the organisation of our existing PSUs, carrying on 
vast educational programme in favour of socialism, building up new cadres and 
thereafter proceed to enlarge the public sector.48F49  
 
In his 1964 article on ‘The Congress System’, Rajni Kothari had ended on a prescient 
note: ‘for all we know, the delicate balance on which the legitimacy and power of the 
Congress system rests may be rudely disturbed, and a more authoritarian system 
might emerge’ [Italics mine].49F50 Alongside the trend of appointing ‘professional 
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experts’ like Haksar, this meant that in late-1960s and early-1970s, the old ‘faction 
chains’ of Congress and their consensual authority gave way to a new consolidation 
of power at the top. As seen above, Haksar exercised a strong, authoritative and, at 
times, arbitrary influence; often, more than elected MPs or ministers and even Chief 
Ministers. HY Sharada Prasad, who served in Mrs Gandhi’s PMO from 1966 to 1977, 
categorised Haksar as an ‘instrument of power’ but one, ‘who did not derive all his 
authority from Indira Gandhi’. Instead, Haksar ‘contributed in no small measure to 
her own dominance and to making the office of the prime minister’s secretary so 
powerful’. Mrs Gandhi herself held that ‘a prime minister’s secretary was as 
important as a cabinet minister and most of the time, knew more about the 
government than any cabinet minister’. It should not be surprising then that 
politicians, of the ruling party itself, ‘found him overbearing’ (Sharada Prasad 2003: 
84-5). 
 
As the experience of Bombay shows, the decimation of a Congress organisation that 
constituted the opposition to Mrs Gandhi’s government in 1969-70 closed for ever the 
possibility of the party at provincial level providing an alternative leadership. 
Elections in the organisation gave way to selections from the top. The ‘competitive 
relationship’ between Congress’ organisation and its government – a critical 
characteristic from 1937 to 1967 – was a thing of past.50F51 What of the opposition then? 
At this time, as the experience of the Communist Party shows, it could only be a 
‘regional or sectional phenomenon’ and oppose the Congress effectively at the state-
level. However, unlike the Nehruvian period when the federal legislature system 
afforded the opposition an importance ‘out of proportion’ to its size, under Mrs 
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Gandhi the Congress had moved to a negative manipulation of exactly the same 
system and its institutions like the Governors’ office. With the 1967 elections 
providing a cue for a reorganisation of ‘the Congress system’ as well as a re-
emergence of opposition, a change came in Centre-State relations as Mrs Gandhi’s 
government’s exchanges with the CPI (M)-led Kerala and DMK-led Tamil Nadu 
show. This internal reorganisation had its limits too as Congress’ troubles in Bihar 
between 1969 and 1975 show. There the ‘old network of social groups, leader-client 
relationships and patronage’ in a highly segmented society of kin and caste held the 
fort and defeated all attempts by the government to reform it via the development 
route. Haksar’s Operation Bihar failed to take off because the Congress party in the 
state refused any disturbance to its carefully-cultivated structure of compromises and 
by this time, 1974-76, Haksar was no more an ‘influential and powerful person’ in 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s government. 
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